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In this paper we use the Indian National Sample Survey data for 1993-94 to examine 
the relationship between women’s education and labor force participation. While it has been 
recognized in the literature that education is associated with lower labor force participation 
for women in South Asia, the reasons behind this association are less well understood. Two 
competing theories potentially explain this phenomenon – one based on cultural factors and 
the other on labor market options. Cultural arguments suggest that women’s withdrawal from 
labor force is associated with improvement in the social status of the family. Higher status 
families choose to educate their daughters, but at the same time, restrict their independence 
through labor force withdrawal. In contrast, structural arguments suggest that educated 
women – like educated men – prefer white collar jobs. Since formal sector jobs only 
comprise 7 percent of all jobs, opportunities for these desirable jobs is limited, resulting in 
labor force withdrawal of women. We propose empirical tests to examine whether job 
availability or patriarchal controls play an important role in shaping this relationship. Our 
results suggest that cultural factors appear to be less important than lack of employment 
opportunities.   
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The literature on human capital posits that women’s labor force participation 
increases with education. Globally, and in most individual countries, both female education 
and female employment have increased over the last several decades, leading Schultz (1994) 
to conclude that the “coincidence of these trends in female participation in the labor force 
and their schooling support the conjecture that women realize more returns to their schooling 
through their work in the market labor force” (Schultz, 1994:49).  Results from the United 
States and many other industrial societies support this. Studies in 1960s when female 
employment began to rise in the United States as well as more recent studies show that 
women with higher education are more likely to be employed than women with lower 
education (Bowen and Finnegan, 1960; Cain, 1966; Tienda, Donato and Cordero Guzman, 
1992). This relationship is even stronger when husband’s income is controlled for (Desai and 
Waite, 1991). 
Although the strength of the relationship between education and employment varies 
across countries, approaching insignificance in some cases (e.g. Brazil (Lam and Dureya, 
1999), South Asia is unique in recording a strong negative relationship between women’s 
education and labor force participation.  Poor and uneducated women in South Asia have 
always been active in the labor force, but among educated women, the labor force 
participation rates are relatively low. In India, at the aggregate level between 1980-95, 
secondary school education for women has almost doubled, but labor force participation has 
remained static and even declined (Figure 1).  In fact, several studies suggest that ceteris 
paribus, labor force participation of women declines with education (Kingdon and Unni, 
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1997; Fafchamps and  Quisumbing, 1999). This paper attempts to understand the reasons 
underlying this decline for individual women. 
 
 
Figure 1: Changes in Secondary Education and Labor Force Participation for 
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Theoretical Framework 
Human capital theories underscore the importance of education in employment 
outcomes.  In particular, there is increasing emphasis in international development 
institutions on female education as a key intervening variable for the achievement of a 
number of development goals.  (Schultz, 1994). Higher returns to education for women are 
also borne out in a number of studies including Psacharopoulos’ (1994) cross-country 
review.  Empirical studies from such diverse settings as Taiwan (Gindling et al, 1994), Czech 
Republic and Slovakia (Chase, 1997) and India (Malathy and Duraisamy, 1993; Duraisamy, 
2000) have shown higher returns to education for women than for men. Such studies and the 
human capital theories on which they are based have become the foundation for the emphasis 
of international institutions on greater investments in girls’ education.  
“Education is essential for raising individual productivity and hence wages.  General 
education gives children skills that will be transferable from job to job and the basic 
tools necessary for further learning.  It augments workers ability to perform standard 
tasks, to process and use information, and to adopt new technologies and production 
practices.” (World Bank, 1995a, P.4) 
Economic theories imply that higher levels of human capital would lead to higher 
wages, beyond the threshold of reservation wages, drawing women into the labor force. 
Given this assumption, literature on women’s labor force participation has tended to overlook 
empirical studies from South Asia (Kingdon and Unni, 1997; Sathar and Desai, 2000; Dreze 
and Gazdar, 1996) which document a negative relationship between women’s education and 
labor force participation. Even within South Asia, the reasons underlying this negative 
relationship have not been well understood.  
  A comprehensive analysis undertaken by the National Commission on Self Employed 
Women and Women in Informal Sector (GOI, 1988) documents that there are few jobs for 
women in regular salaried or formal jobs – either as office workers or as factory workers - 
resulting in women’s concentration in the informal sector. Since educated men and women 
often do not want to work in menial jobs as casual laborers or on family farms, many are  
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unable to find acceptable jobs, resulting in their withdrawal from the labor force. Several 
studies on India have argued that low returns to education for women, discourage families 
from educating their daughters (Kingdon and Unni, 1997; Dreze and Gazdar, 1996).  For 
instance, Kingdon and Unni (1997) also show that for Indian women, only education beyond 
level junior/middle level enhances wage work participation
3. 
A second line of thought suggests that women’s employment in India, as elsewhere, 
is determined to a large extent by cultural norms that govern women’s mobility and market 
work.  These norms operate at multiple levels and often mirror the status of women in a 
particular region, caste, or religion, permeating the household as well as the public sphere 
(Kemp, 1986, Kapadia, 1995; Desai and Jain, 1994). Thus, the gender stratification system at 
the macro-level determines women’s lower opportunities in the formal labor market, while 
restrictions within the home affect the kinds of work that women can do.  These constraints 
often push women into non-wage (such as self-employed) and unpaid work, or out of the 
labor force (Raju and Bagchi, 1993; Ghosh, 1995; Sethuraman, 1998; Elson, 1999).  
“Given the preoccupation with status-appropriate work for women, villagers 
themselves often rank castes by whether they allow women to work: 
only within their courtyards/homesteads 
only at their own farms 
only within the courtyards/homesteads of others 
only at the farms of others 
in other activities within the village  
in other activities outside the village. 
Under this ranking scale, the more secluded the woman the higher her household’s 
status or prestige,” (Chen, 1995, P.46). 
These restrictions on women’s physical mobility and their attendant withdrawal from 
the labor force originate from the social construction of gender and work in South Asia and 
the Middle East. While it  has long been recognized that high status families encourage 
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female seclusion whereas poor women have no choice but to work (Youssuf, 1974), some 
studies have gone a step further and argued that women’s withdrawal from the labor force is 
not just a sign of a family’s high status, but that this action in itself contributes to increased 
status (Papanek, 1988; Standing, 1991)
4.   
However, education is related to employment through both income and substitution 
effects. Educated women marry educated men, who have higher incomes. Since high income 
families have a lesser need of women’s contribution to the household, this encourages the 
labor force withdrawal of women. On the other hand, educated women also have higher 
incomes than less educated women, which ought to encourage their labor force participation. 
Studies show that while higher income families may be less likely to need women’s income; 
when employed, educated women have higher incomes, and it has been observed in other 
societies that in the absence of patriarchal controls, this income effect should dominate the 
substitution effect (Brinton, Lee and Parish, 1995). 
Thus, the literature attributes women’s declining labor force participation with 
education to two factors: (1) Structural effect due to lack of  opportunities for educated 
women; and, (2) cultural effects whereby high socioeconomic status simultaneously 
encourages higher education and labor force withdrawal. While several scholars have 
attempted to address these two points of view in ethnographic w ork (Sharma, 1980; 
Standing, 1991), few studies have actually been able to disentangle these causal mechanisms.  
In this paper, we propose two separate ways of testing these competing theories.  
First, we test the structural argument by directly examining the effect of opportunity 
structure on women’s labor force participation. This test relies on the argument that while 
women’s own education may be a function of familial socioeconomic status, the educational 
level of the village or residential block is independent of the class location of the index 
family. The educational level of the village or residential block can be expected to affect 
women’s employment, independent of family preferences, in a way that allows us to test the 
opportunity structure/competition hypothesis.  
                                                                                                                                                       
employment as a category. 
4 Standing (1991) documents the effect that the ideological re-structuring of the domestic domain had at the turn 
of the 20
th century on women’s work participation in Bengal, whereby women from upper class families  
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One direct effect of this cluster level education is to increase the pool of educated 
workers looking for jobs in the formal sector. Among the uneducated workers, only 4 percent 
are in the formal sector jobs and nearly 48 percent are casual daily wage workers. In contrast, 
among the employed individuals with at least secondary education, 38 percent are in the 
formal sector and only 12 percent are casual wage workers (Das, 2002). Thus, there is an 
overwhelming preference for formal sector j obs among educated individuals in India. 
However, the number of formal sector jobs is extremely small and these account for about 7 
percent of all jobs with about 70 percent of these being provided by the government in 
hospitals, schools, public works and public administration. Since the growth of these jobs 
depends upon services needed by a population rather than the education level of the 
population, these jobs do not increase commensurately with the increase in the education at 
the village level.  Hence, increasing education leads to increased competition for scarce jobs. 
Thus, by controlling for cluster level education, we are able to examine the direct effect of 
opportunity structure and competition on women’s employment.  
Second, we use caste as a proxy for cultural values.  We examine the importance of 
cultural factors on women’s labor force participation directly by interacting education with 
caste. Apart from gender and social class, caste is the other major axis of inequality and 
disadvantage in India.  Paradoxically, due to historical reasons, while lower castes are 
generally disadvantaged in the social structure, restrictions on lower caste women are less 
marked than those on upper caste women (Beteille, 1991; Agarwal, 1994).  Among upper 
castes, k eeping women within the confines of the home is a matter of family honor. 
Pioneering research by M.N. Srinivas (1966) provides an interesting explanation. Upper 
castes have adopted a Brahminical style of life in which ritual purity, absence of widow 
remarriage and women’s seclusion play an important role in asserting their high status. Mid 
and lower level castes often emulate these norms in a process known as “sanskritization” in 
order to upgrade their social status.  
However, the lowest castes, often known as the Scheduled Castes (due to their listing 
in a schedule appended to the Constitution), have no possibility of escaping their low social 
                                                                                                                                                       
managed to become visible in the public domain, but the “petty bourgeoisie” kept their women securely tied to 
the home.  
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status and consequently see little reason to encourage loss of income associated with 
women’s withdrawal from the labor force. The Scheduled Castes comprise about 18 percent 
of the population.  In addition to upper and lower castes, approximately 8 percent of the 
Indian population is “tribal”. Scheduled Tribes, (enumerated in another schedule of the 
Constitution), fall outside the ritual pale of the Hindu caste system.  Its members, like the 
Scheduled Castes, are among the poorest in the society (Govt. of India, 2001) but tribal laws 
and customs have always given great importance to women and gender inequality in tribal 
families is considered to be far lower than in upper caste families (Beteille, 1991; Maharatna, 
2000). 
Caste and class are correlated, but this correlation is far from perfect. For example, 
the proportion of upper castes below the national poverty line was 36 percent in 1993-94, 
while for the Scheduled Castes this proportion was over 48 percent and for Scheduled Tribes 
it was over 51 percent. Similarly, the average female literacy rate in India according to the 
1991 census was 50 percent, but only 23.8 percent of Scheduled Caste women and 18 percent 
of Scheduled Tribe women were literate (Govt. of India, 2001). Thus, while Schedule Caste 
and Tribe families are poor, so are many upper caste households.  
For Scheduled Castes and Tribes, apart from gender and  caste based dynamics, 
another factor has a strong bearing on labor market options. On the whole, Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes are discriminated against in the labor market. However, in an attempt at creating 
positive discrimination, the Constitution of India guarantees reserved quotas in legislatures, 
government jobs, government funded educational institutions and public sector companies to 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes.  At each level of recruitment, 15 percent of the jobs are 
reserved for Scheduled Castes and 7.5 percent for Scheduled Tribes. 
Thus, Scheduled Castes and Tribes  have a captive pool of regular salaried jobs
5.  
This is particularly relevant in a labor market where the major part of formal jobs are in the 
public sector. However, this does not necessarily mean that Scheduled Caste and Tribe 
individuals are able to get these jobs. Many positions remain vacant with the management 
claiming lack of suitable candidates. There are no special quotas for females from Scheduled 
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Castes and Tribes
6 and it is quite likely that males from among Scheduled Castes and Tribes 
may capture these jobs. Moreover, such regular salaried jobs employ less than one-tenth of 
the employed persons.  Nonetheless, educated Scheduled Castes and Tribe candidates for 
government jobs do have reserved seats and do not have to compete in the general pool. 
Consequently, in addition to lower gender inequality, job reservation may be  another factor 
pulling Scheduled Castes and Tribe women into the labor force. Thus, if education has any 
positive effect on labor force participation, we would expect to see it first among Scheduled 
Caste and Tribe women. 
In our framework we have created a stylized dichotomy of cultural versus structural 
factors.  In fact, the two may be linked and reinforce each other.  However, since the 
literature focuses on cultural to the exclusion of structural factors in women’s labor market 
outcomes, our paper proposes a way of dealing with both issues.  Therefore, we start from 
the fact that gender inequality is higher among upper castes than among lowest castes and 
restrictions on women’s mobility and associated withdrawal from the labor force are far more 
prized in the former (Agarwal, 1994; Murthi et al, 1996). This would imply that: 
1.  If women’s withdrawal from the labor force with high education is due to the 
fact highly educated women come from the upper strata and are less likely to be in the labor 
force due to status reasons, then one would expect this effect to operate mainly in upper caste 
families.  For the Scheduled Caste and Tribe families this would not be a relevant issue. 
Thus, we would expect education to decrease employment in upper caste families but 
increase employment in the Scheduled Caste and Tribe families. 
2.  If on the other hand, women’s withdrawal from the labor force is due to lack 
of appropriate jobs, then both upper and lower caste women as well as tribal and non-tribal 
women would show declining labor force participation with education.  
Data and Methods 
We use data from the Indian National Sample Survey 50
th round (1993-94) to test 
these arguments.  Schedule 10 of the survey on Employment and Unemployment has detailed 
                                                 
6 There are special targets in large scale employment generation and asset creation programs that the 
administration has to abide by and include at lease 30 percent women as program beneficiaries.  These 
programs are typically for persons below the poverty line and the employment is generally as casual labor.  
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data on employment.  The National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) of India conducts 
quinquennial surveys on consumption expenditure and employment.  These surveys are 
considered to be one of the most reliable data sources for India.   The 50
th Round surveyed 
115,354 households located in 6,951 villages and 4,650 urban blocks.  In all, it has data on 
356,289 persons in rural and 208,248 persons in urban areas, providing a large national 
sample size.  The NSS data are highly regarded and widely used for planning purposes in 
India.  We restrict the analytic sample to women in the age group 20-55 – prime working 
years in regular salaried employment. In so doing, we are left with a sample size of 130,361 
women.  All analysis is weighted to make it nationally representative using Intercooled 
STATA 7.0. 
Exact definitions of variables used in this analysis are provided in Table 1, descriptive 
statistics are presented in Tables 2 through 4 and logistic regression results are presented in 
Table 5. We estimate three logistic regression models predicting the probability of being 
employed
7. The first model estimates the probability of being employed while controlling for 
education and a number of other individual and household characteristics.  The second adds 
opportunity structure and competition in the form of mean primary education and mean post-
primary education in the village or urban sampling block to the model.  The third model then 
adds interaction terms between Scheduled Caste and Tribe with education. 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable, employment status, is a dummy variable, 1 if employed and 
0 otherwise. It is important to note that the data on women’s labor force participation in 
developing countries have been highly criticized as resulting in serious omission of women’s 
work due to undercount (Beneria, 1982; Jain and Banerjee, 1985). Much of this criticism has 
come from Indian feminists who have worked extensively with the National Sample Survey 
Organisation to develop more nuanced measures of women’s work including questions on 
non-remunerative activities that are often encompassed under domestic chores such as farm 
work and looking after cattle. Consequently, women’s labor force participation as measured 
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by National Sample Survey is about five percentage points higher than as measured by the 
Census for both urban and rural India (Desai, 1999). 
Independent Variables 
Our independent variables of interest are education (coded as two dummies indicating 
primary education and post-primary education, with uneducated as the omitted category) and 
caste (coded as two dummies for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, with upper caste as 
the omitted category).  We also include a number of important control variables indicating 
residence and demographic characteristics of the individual and the household (See Table 2 
and 3). In addition, we capture the effect of opportunity structure through mean primary and 
post-primary education in the village or urban block. This is calculated by counting the 
number of individuals aged 20 to 55 with primary and post primary education in the sample 
who reside in the same village or urban block (excluding the respondent) and dividing this by 
the village specific sample size. For most villages, this implies a sample size of 20-26 per 
village/block.   
In addition to education and caste, we control for a number of background factors 
known to be related to employment.  These include age, a squared term for age, religion, 
marital status, presence of children under 5 in the household, household size, urban 
residence, and region of residence.  
Results 
The results of the logistic regression predicting labor force participation in Model 1 
indicate that primary and post-primary education each significantly reduces the likelihood of 
being employed for women.    Moreover, Scheduled Caste and Tribe women, women living 
in rural areas, older women, unmarried women, those without a child in the household under 
the age of five, and those living in small and nuclear families are more likely to be employed.  
In addition, women who live in southern and western states are at a large advantage and 
those in the northern states are at a slight advantage (compared to Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh, the omitted category) for labor force participation.  The picture that 
emerges so far, is consistent with the literature.   
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  Model 2 adds the effect of mean primary and post-primary education in the village or 
urban block to the model.  This is intended to capture the level of competition in the area.  
There is a large negative effect of mean primary (coefficient of -0.79) and an even larger one 
of post-primary education (coefficient of  -1.58) on women’s labor force participation.  These 
large and significant negative effects have interesting implications for the research on the 
relationship between education and women’s employment. In as much as higher regional 
education captures the economic development of the region, which implies higher 
employment opportunities, this should increase the labor force participation. However, while 
some positive effect is probably present, it is by far superceded by the increase in 
competition due to a higher pool of educated individuals. In other words, while we would 
have expected areas with higher levels of education in the aggregate to be more developed 
and have a higher demand for labor, the likelihood that emerges from these results is that the 
supply of educated labor far exceeds the demand.  In results not presented here, similar 
analyses were undertaken for males with similar results. For males, the negative coefficient 
of cluster level primary education is -0.21 (significant at 0.05 level) and that for post-primary 
education is -1.1 (significant at 0.001 level).  
  The addition to cluster level education variables fails to fully account for all of the 
individual level education effect, although it reduces the size of these coefficients to some 
extent. Moreover, in as much as education level of the community is associated with other 
factors such as presence of young children and residence in southern and western part of the 
country, controlling for the community level education accentuates the effect of these 
variables to a modest degree. 
In Model 3, we interact education with Scheduled Castes and Tribes. In our 
conceptual framework we had argued that if the negative effect of education on women’s 
employment was driven by cultural factors, it would be largely limited to the upper caste 
women. Under these conditions, we would expect the interaction terms for education 
variables and scheduled caste/tribe to be positive and large enough in magnitude to 
compensate for the negative main effect of education.   Primary education  reduces the 
likelihood of being employed for all women with a coefficient of  -0.46.  However, for 
Scheduled Caste women, this effect is offset by a positive interaction term (SC*Primed),  
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which suggests that for Scheduled Caste women, the negative effect of primary education on 
employment is lower than for other women but not absent by any means.  With post-primary 
education, the interaction term (SC*Postpri) is negative and significant, suggesting that post-
primary education disadvantages Scheduled Caste women even more than it does upper caste 
women. Interaction terms for Scheduled Tribe and education present a similar picture.  
While this paper has focused only on women, it is important to note that the lack of 
labor market opportunities also affects male labor participation, albeit this effect is largely 
limited to young men. Table 6 documents the decline in labor force participation for men 
with education. The results show that for men aged 20 to 30, labor force participation 
declines as education increases with the greatest effect noted for men with post-primary 
education. These men probably represent the often remarked upon group of educated 
unemployed men who are waiting to find a suitable white collar job and filling out job 
applications. A wait of 2-3 years to find a suitable government position is fairly common. 
After 30, however, men either find what they are looking for or give up waiting for a formal 
sector job and accept whatever job is available. In contrast, the negative relationship between 
education and women’s labor force participation persists at all ages. Education for women in 
India is far rarer than that for men; thus, educated women are likely to come from higher 
socioeconomic strata than educated men and to marry higher income husbands. Hence, 
educated women have greater family resources allowing them to stay out of the labor force if 
a desirable job is not available, an option rarely available to men. 
Discussion 
Research presented above indicates that education leads to lower employment for 
women in India, whether for upper caste or for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe 
women. We have tested two potential explanations: (1) A structural explanation which 
suggests that lack of suitable employment opportunities results in labor force withdrawal of 
educated women; and, (2) A cultural explanation which suggests that the relationship 
between education and employment for women is spurious with higher socioeconomic status 
families encouraging both education and labor force withdrawal. Our results support the 
structural explanation.   
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  We argue that first that lack of suitable employment reduces the labor force options of 
educated individuals seeking jobs in the formal sector. In another analysis we found that the 
occupational structure for men and women had remained largely unaltered between the 
decade of the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s in India (Desai and Das, 2002).  Second, gender 
inequality at a macro level further reduces women’s employment options. Favored formal 
sector jobs are dominated by men; only 15 percent of the formal sector jobs are filled by 
women. In absence of formal sector jobs, the only options available to educated women is to 
work on family farms, as vegetable vendors, domestic servants or daily laborers. Since 
educated women are usually married to educated men and are likely to have some financial 
resources, instead of accepting poorly paid jobs as casual wage workers, these women choose 
to remain out of the labor force.  
  We have tested the structural explanation directly by examining the impact of cluster 
level education (exogenous to individual education/employment relationship) on women’s 
labor force participation. The results suggest that women who live in areas with higher levels 
of education face increased competition in the labor market since there are more educated 
individuals competing for a small pool of formal sector jobs. While it is possible that to some 
extent the regional education level is confounded with regional development, an examination 
of state level differences in education in India does not support this possibility. Literacy and 
poverty appear to be only loosely connected in India. Among states with very high levels of 
literacy, some have high levels of poverty (e.g. Maharashtra) and others have low levels of 
poverty (e.g. Kerala); while among states with low levels of literacy, some have a high 
incidence of poverty (e.g. Bihar and Madhya Pradesh) and others have a lower incidence of 
poverty (e.g. Rajasthan). Even if they were connected, one would expect that areas with high 
levels of education would have a better economy and hence more job opportunities. Under 
these circumstances, we would not expect cluster level education to be negatively related to 
employment of both men and women. 
  While these results provide a test of the impact of lack of jobs and higher competition 
of women’s labor force participation, interactions with caste and tribal status provide a test of 
the impact of cultural factors. Here we had hypothesized that in as much as the negative 
effect of women’s labor force participation is associated with educated women coming from  
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higher social classes with greater preference for women’s seclusion and withdrawal from the 
labor force, we would expect to see these effects mostly limited to upper caste women. 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes have never placed the same premium on women’s seclusion as 
upper caste families.  Since women from Scheduled Castes and Tribes are less likely to be 
subject to patriarchal controls and receive some benefits from positive discrimination, we 
expected that if cultural arguments are important, the negative impact of education on 
women’s employment should be largely limited to the upper caste households.  
Our results suggest that both upper caste as well as Scheduled Caste and Tribe 
women are less likely to be employed if they are educated.  The negative impact of primary 
education on labor force participation, is moderated for Scheduled Caste and Tribe women 
due to a small but positive interaction term. However, for women with post-primary 
education, there is little difference in the decline in labor force participation between upper 
caste women and Scheduled Caste and Tribe women; in fact, Scheduled Caste and Tribe 
women are even more likely to drop out of the labor force than upper caste women.  
  This observation provides prima facie evidence that cultural factors play a less 
important role in women’s labor force withdrawal than structural factors. It is however, 
important to note a caveat. It may well be that as Schedule Caste/Tribe families become 
affluent, they start behaving like upper caste families and increase the patriarchal  controls on 
women. This, rather than an absence of cultural forces, may account for our results. We have 
no way of ruling out this possibility totally. However, even if some convergence between 
Scheduled Caste/Tribes and upper caste families is likely, there is no reason to expect that 
Schedule Caste/Tribe would begin to employ  greater patriarchal controls on women than 
their upper  caste counterparts, resulting in greater labor force withdrawal for Schedule 
Caste/Tribe women with secondary education.  
Another reason for our results could be that cultural and structural factors reinforce 
each other.  It may thus be likely that the labor market has internalized and accepted the 
notion that women are less likely to wok.  Asymmetrical information available to men and 
women regarding job vacancies, mechanisms to apply and attend interviews may hinder 
women’s entry into employment as well.   
To what extent could the classic U-curve hypothesis explain our results?   
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“The labor force participation of women often changes in significant ways as 
development proceeds.  Female participation rates tend to be higher when an 
economy is organized around family-based production in agriculture.  With 
economic growth and increased urbanization, participation often declines, as 
women stay at home and men go out to work.  At still higher levels of income 
per capita, female participation increases again as labor market options for 
women increase.  Patterns of labor force participation also reflect cultural and 
ideological differences.”  
World Bank, World Development Report, 1995:25. 
In the case of India, unlike South East Asian countries, there has been no 
“feminization” of the work force with increasing levels of GDP growth.  In fact, Indian 
women have been “at the bottom of the U” in terms of labor force participation, for several 
decades, in spite of steady growth in the GDP
8.  This brings us to the type of growth that has 
occurred in India, which has not been accompanied with large scale employment 
opportunities leading to concern over “job-less growth” (Ghosh 1998; 2001).  This has 
assumed particular importance in the context of liberalization policies, and shrinking jobs in 
the public sector.   
Implications for Policy 
Human capital approaches to development have tended to see education, employment 
and economic growth as being intertwined with increased education driving economic 
growth and leading to better employment opportunities. Our results suggest that the link 
between the two may not be as close a previously assumed, at least in the short run. 
Investments in education have many social benefits ranging from decline in fertility (Axinn 
and Barber, 2001) to marital power (Oropesa, 1997).  However, their labor market returns are 
far from certain. 
  The identification of the causes underlying the negative relationship between 
education and labor force participation in South Asia has important policy implications. If 
cultural predisposition causes this negative relationship, then one can expect that school 
                                                 
8 The GDP growth rate in India has improved from an average of about 5.7 percent per annum in the 1980s to 
about 6.5 percent in the 1990s (Govt of India, 2001).  
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enrollment for girls will keep increasing in the foreseeable future because parents are able to 
maintain the gender system even as education attainment increases.  In fact, parents, 
husbands and parents-in-law of educated women are even more successful in maintaining 
patriarchal controls than the relatives of uneducated women. In contrast, if labor market 
opportunity structures determine the relationship between education and labor force 
participation then we might expect a backlash reducing the growth in girls’ education. If 
parents respond to earning potential (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996) and this potential is 
limited for educated women, then parental incentives to invest in girls’ schooling may also be 
limited. When there is sufficient income and school fees are low, parents may send girls to 
school. But in economic adversity or when school fees increase during structural adjustment, 
girls school enrollment m ay suffer.   This leads us to echo an observation by Buchmann 
(2000) in the Kenyan context, suggesting the importance of public policies that redress the 
mismatch between educational outcomes and employment opportunities. 
While the realization that education is not a simple panacea for employment problems 
is becoming better understood than it was (GOI, 2001), yet the rhetoric on simply raising 
education status continues to  dominate the policy literature.  The policy implications of our 
findings center on two important issues – quality of education and quality of employment. 
The capability approach put forward by Sen (1999) captures the role of human capital as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for enhancing the capabilities of human beings. He 
makes two important points – one, that education and “human capital” are necessary for 
growth and income, but that they are not sufficient to enjoy the fruits of that growth or 
income.  Second, education does not merely fulfill the function of enhancing growth – nor 
should this be its only raison d etre.  It strengthens the capability of individuals to lead the 
kind of life they desire. 
Education has to be accompanied by substantial growth if it is to have an impact on 
employment.  In India, with the progress of economic reforms initiated in the 1980s, public 
sector jobs will continue to decline. Thus, economic growth will need to be accompanied by 
alternate secure jobs and some means to ensure that social inequality is recognized in the 
recruitment to these jobs.  This means growth in private jobs with provisions of job security, 
social security, and benefits.  In addition, changes in women’s access to information through  
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institutional mechanisms, provision of childcare and other legal changes that facilitate their 
access to employment must accompany an increase in jobs.  
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Table 1:  Independent Variables and their Description 
Variable  Survey Codes  Coding 
Age* 
 
In years  i. In years 
ii.  Age Squared as a continuous variable 




Married =1 if currently married 
Any other =0 
 














Caste  SC – Scheduled Caste 
ST – Scheduled Tribe  
General - Non-SC/ST 
Scheduled Caste (SC)=1 
Scheduled Tribe (ST)=1 
Reference: Non-SC or ST 
Education  No education 
Literate through attending 
non-formal classes 





Graduate in various 
disciplines 
Literate through primary =1 




Region  States  North =1 if Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, 
Rajasthan, Chandigarh, Delhi 
 
East =1 if West Bengal, Orissa, Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands 
 
West =1 if Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Dadra and Nagar 
Haveli, Daman and Diu 
 
South =1 if Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra 
Pradesh, Lakshadweep, Pondicherry 
 
North-East =1 if Manipur, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, 
Sikkim, Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland 
 





Table 1:  Independent Variables and their Description (cont’d) 
 
Variable  Survey Codes  Coding 
*Age, age squared, percent of people with primary and secondary education in the cluster are treated as 
continuous variables in the analysis, the rest are categorical variables. 
 
Childcare needs 
of household  
Males under 5 years 
Females under 5 years 
Child5=1 if household has at least one child under five 
Child5=0 otherwise 
Household Size  Number of members  Medium =1 if size = 4-6 
Large=1 if size >6 











law, sister-in-law, other 
relative 
Servant, employee other 
non-relative 
Extended family=1 if respondent’s relationship to head 
is married child, unmarried child, grandchild, father, 
mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law 
brother, sister, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, other 
relative. 
 







Calculated from all 
individuals (males and 
females) aged  20-55 in a 
given village/urban block 
excluding respondent 
 
No. of individuals with 
Primary(post-primary) 
education)/No. of 
individuals in the village 
included in the sample 
excluding respondent 
Ranges from 0 to 1   
 20 
Table 2:  Means of Key Independent Variables In Appendix 
 
Variable  Mean 
Employed  0.34 
Caste   
Scheduled Caste   0.18 
Scheduled Tribe  0.09 
Non-Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe  0.73 
Religion 
Hindu   0.84 
Islam   0.10 
Other religions   0.06 
Education   
No Education  0.63 
Primary Education  0.18 
Post Primary Education   0.19 
Community Education Level   
Proportion primary education  0.32 
Proportion secondary education  0.22 
Marital Status 
Married   0.87 
Not Married   0.08 
Age  34.26 
Urban  25.2 
Region   
North  0.11 
Central   0.32 
South   0.26 
East  0.13 
West   0.15 
North-East  0.04 
Household Structure 
Presence of a Child under 5  0.48 
Medium  households (4-6)  0.37 
Large households (7+)  0.45 





Table 3:  Employment Status of Women by Caste 
  Scheduled Caste  Scheduled Tribe  Non SC/ST 
  N  Percent  N  Percent  N  Percent 
Employed  9435  40.16  6356  56.18  66842  30.05 







Table 4: Employment Status of Women by Education Level 
  Uneducated  Primary Education  Post Primary Education 
  N  Percent  N  Percent  N  Percent 
Employed  33699  41.00     6151  26.14  4654  18.89 






Table 5: Logistic Regression predicting the probability of being employed for women aged  
20-55 
 






Interaction of Caste 
with Education 
Education Variables        
Primary Education  -0.67***  -0.43***  -0.46*** 
Secondary Education  -1.03***  -0.59***  -0.58*** 
Caste/Religion Variables        
Scheduled Caste (SC)  0.27***  0.24***  0.23*** 
Scheduled Tribe (ST)  0.96***  0.83***  0.82*** 
Muslim  -0.81***  -0.86***  -0.86*** 
Other Religion  -0.15***  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
Demographic Variables        
Age  0.16***  0.17***  0.17*** 
Age Square  0.00***  0.00***  0.00*** 
Married  -0.84***  -0.87***  -0.87*** 
Medium Household  -0.28***  -0.25***  -0.25*** 
Large Household  -0.33***  -0.32***  -0.32*** 
Presence of Child under 5  -0.06***  -0.09***  -0.09*** 
Not Head/Spouse of Head  -0.20***  -0.20***  -0.21*** 
Residence Variables        
Urban  -0.82***  -0.58***  0.13*** 
North  0.12***  0.13***  -0.29*** 
East  -0.37***  -0.29***  1.26*** 
West  1.14***  1.27***  1.27*** 
South  1.20***  1.27***  -0.15*** 
North East  -0.29***  -0.14***  0.13*** 
Community Education 
Levels 
     
Mean Primary Ed.    -0.79***  -0.80*** 
Mean Secondary Ed.    -1.58***  -1.58*** 
Interaction of Caste with 
Education 
     
SC * Prim. Ed      0.17*** 
SC * Secondary Ed.      -0.06*** 
ST * Prim. Ed.      0.18*** 
ST * Secondary Ed.      -0.14*** 
Constant  -2.46***  -2.16***  -2.15*** 
 
*** p <= 0.001 
** p <= 0.01 
* p <= 0.05 
+ p <=0.1 
 






Table 6: Percent of Men and Women Employed by Education and Age 
 
Men  Women   
Age 20-30  Age 30-55  Age 20-30  Age 30-55 
Uneducated  97.1  97.2  37.8  43.2 
Primary Education  96.7  97.7  25.5  26.8 
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